Literature/1990/Umpleby
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- http://www.gwu.edu/~umpleby/Science_Cybernetics.txt
- An earlier draft was prepared for a conference on Mutual Uses of Cybernetics and Science, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, March 27-April 1, 1989.
Authors
edit- Department of Management Science, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052.
- http://www.gwu.edu/~umpleby/
Abstract
editRecent developments in cybernetics have challenged key tenets in the philosophy of science. The philosophy of science constitutes a theory of knowledge which is often called realism. However, the philosophy of science is not a unified field, there are a variety of points of view. Contemporary cybernetics, meanwhile, is developing a philosophy called constructivism. This paper compares cybernetics with two important schools of thought within the philosophy of science, lists several different assumptions which lead to misunderstandings between scientists and cyberneticians, and then suggests a way of resolving the differences, not by rejecting science but by enlarging it.
Excerpts
editCybernetians now focus on the observer in addition to what is observed (Segal, 1986). They are developing a philosophy of constructivism as an alternative to realism (Von Glasersfeld, 1987). Rather than the idea that scientific laws are discovered, as one might discover an island in the ocean, cyberneticians claim that scientific laws are invented to explain regularities in our experiences. Rather than believing that science describes reality, cyberneticians assert that each individual constructs a personal "reality" which fits his or her experiences. One of the motivations for developing this theory is the belief that if people adopt this view, they will become more tolerant of others.
Cyberneticians have distinguished the recent work in cybernetics on constructivist epistemologies from the earlier work on control systems by using the term "second order cybernetics." This term was first used by Heinz von Foerster who defined first order cybernetics as the cybernetics of observed systems, whereas second order cybernetics is the cybernetics of observing systems (Von Foerster, 1979). Von Foerster intends the term "observing systems" to be interpreted in two ways -- either systems which observe or the act of observing systems. Gordon Pask made a similar distinction when he defined first order cybernetics as dealing with the purpose of a model, whereas second order cybernetics deals with the purpose of the modeler. Francisco Varela suggested that first order cybernetics is concerned with controlled systems, whereas second order cybernetics is concerned with autonomous systems.
I have proposed two additional conceptions of second order cybernetics (Umpleby, 1979). First order cybernetics can be said to be concerned with interactions among the variables in a system, whereas second order cybernetics is concerned with the interaction between the observer and the observed. The final definition goes beyond the one-brain problem of psychology or artificial intelligence and focuses instead on the n-brain problem of communities or societies. First order cybernetics can be illustrated by theories of social systems, whereas second order cybernetics deals with the interaction between ideas and society. For a summary of the definitions of first and second order cybernetics, see Table 1. [1]
Table 1. Definitions of First and Second Order Cybernetics
FIRST ORDER SECOND ORDER
AUTHOR CYBERNETICS CYBERNETICS
Von Foerster the cybernetics of the cybernetics of
observed systems observing systems
Pask the purpose of the purpose of
a model a modeler
Varela controlled systems autonomous systems
Umpleby interaction among interaction between
the variables in a observer and
system observed
Umpleby theories of social theories of the
systems interaction between
ideas and society
Reviews
editWikimedia
editChronology
edit- Foerster, Heinz von (1990). "Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics," SEHR, volume 4, issue 2 (1995) Constructions of the Mind [^]
- Umpleby, Stuart A. (1990). "The Science of Cybernetics and the Cybernetics of Science," Cybernetics and Systems, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 109-121. [^]
- Kochen, Manfred, ed. (1989). The Small World: A Volume of Recent Research Advances Commemorating Ithiel de Sola Pool, Stanley Milgram, Theodore Newcomb. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp. (January 1, 1989). [^]
- Adler, Mortimer J. & Geraldine van Doren (1988). Reforming Education: The Opening of the American Mind. New York: Macmillan. [^]
- Norman, Donald (1988). The Design of Everyday Things (Originally titled The Psychology of Everyday Things (POET)). [^]
- Literature/1987/Glasersfeld [^]
- Literature/1986/Segal [^]
- Winograd, Terry and Flores, Fernando (1986). Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design. Ablex Publishing Corp. [^]
- Literature/1985/Miller [^]
- Literature/1983/Gareth [^]
- Literature/1980/Engel [^]
- Maturana, Humberto and Francisco Varela (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Boston: Reidel. [^]
- Literature/1979/Umpleby [^]
- Foerster, Heinz von (1979). "Cybernetics of Cybernetics," in: Klaus Krippendorff, ed., Communication and Control in Society. New York: Gordon and Breach. [^]
- Pool, Ithiel de Sola & Manfred Kochen (1978). "Contacts and Influence." Social Networks, 1, pp. 1-51. [^]
- Simon, Herbert (1977). Models of Discovery: And Other Topics in the Methods of Science. Springer [^]
- Bateson, Gregory & Mead, Margaret (1976). "For God's Sake, Margaret: Conversation with Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead." CoEvolutionary Quarterly (Summer 1976) no. 10, pp. 22-44. [^]
- Pask, Gordon (1976). Conversation Theory: Applications in Education and Epistemology. New York: Elsevier. [^]
- Beer, Stafford (1975). Platform for Change: A Message from Stafford Beer. New York: Wiley, 1975. [^]
- Hacking, Ian (1975). Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? Cambridge University Press. [^]
- Kochen, Manfred, ed. (1975). Information for Action: from Knowledge to Wisdom. New York: Academic Press. [^]
- 1975/March/J [^]
- Pask, Gordon (1975). Conversation, Cognition and Learning. Elsevier. [^]
- Polanyi, Michael & Harry Prosch (1975). Meaning. University of Chicago Press. [^]
- Abramovitz, Robert and Heinz von Foerster (1974). Cybernetics of Cybernetics or the Control of Control and the Communication of Communication (result of a course, fall semester 1973, continued through spring semester 1974, sponsored by a grant from the Point Foundation to the Biological Computer Laboratory, University of Illinois), Urbana, Ill.: Biological Computer Laboratory, 1974. [^]
- Cherry, Colin (1957). On Human Communication: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism . The M.I.T. Press, 1966. [^]
- Hayakawa, S. I. (1949). Language in Thought and Action. Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1949. [^]
- Shannon, Claude E. & Warren Weaver (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois Press. [^]
- Wiener, Norbert (1948). Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. 2nd ed., The MIT Press, 1965. [^]
- Bush, Vannevar (1945). "As We May Think." The Atlantic Monthly (July 1945): 101-108. [^]
- Huxley, Aldous (1940). Words and Their Meanings. The Ward Ritchie Press, 1940. [^]
- Bernal, J. D. (1939). The Social Function of Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. [^]
- Wells, H. G. (1938). World Brain. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co. [^]
- Korzybski, Alfred (1933). Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. 5th ed., Institute of General Semantics, 1994. [^]
- Ogden, C. K. & I. A. Richards (1923). The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. [^]
Comments
edit
Notes
edit- ↑ See also 1976/Bateson.
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| The shade of the bar looks invariant in isolation but variant in context, in (favor of) sharp contrast with the color gradient background, hence an innate illusion we have to reasonably interpret and overcome as well as the mirage. Such variance appearing seasonably from context to context may not only be the case with our vision but worldview in general in practice indeed, whether a priori or a posteriori. Perhaps no worldview from nowhere, without any point of view or prejudice at all!
Ogden & Richards (1923) said, "All experience ... is either enjoyed or interpreted ... or both, and very little of it escapes some degree of interpretation." H. G. Wells (1938) said, "The human individual is born now to live in a society for which his fundamental instincts are altogether inadequate." |