Motivation and emotion/Book/2023/Vicarious embarrassment
What is vicarious embarrassment, why does it occur, and how can it be managed?
Overview
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 Imagine the following situation: you are attending a lecture. While you are sitting down in the packed lecture hall the lecturer walks down the aisle, trips over, and lands flat on their face. Everyone in the lecture hall laughs, yet somehow it is you that feels the embarrassment. Is it because you personally relate with their embarrassment? Is it because in their place you would feel similarly embarrassed? The answer is that the experienced emotion is vicarious embarrassment, a form of embarrassment experienced from observing the embarrassing actions of another individual. |
Vicarious embarrassment is an interesting if emerging field - while our understanding of vicarious emotions is still developing, it is crucial to understand how we as social creatures interact and engage in pro-social behaviours. For vicarious embarrassment it is important for us to learn the causes, both neurological and psychological, the moderation factors, the function, and the ways in which we can manage the potentially maladaptive forms of this emotion. Similarly it can be important for us to learn how, if at all, vicarious embarrassment differs from embarrassment or simply empathy.
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Key questions:
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What is vicarious embarrassment?
editVicarious embarrassment exists with a lot of overlap with other concepts such as embarrassment and shame, so it is initially important to understand how these emotions differ.
Embarrassment
editEmbarrassment is an emotional state associated with varying levels of anxiety and discomfort as well as accompanied by feelings of exposure, abashment, awkwardness, and regret, primarily experienced in response to violation of a sort of social norm especially that which threatens the social image of the individual (Krach et al., 2011). It can also occur in private if the individual appraises the action as socially transgressive, due to the individual being concerned about appraisal from an imagined other (Krisna et al., 2015). Embarrassment is generally viewed as a response similar to stress wherein individuals may engage in behaviours to compensate for the social transgression, potentially by acknowledging said action to others through blushing and a desire to correct oneself (see Figure 2; Müller-Pinzler et al., 2015). The emotional experience of embarrassment is typically accompanied by blushing (see Figure 3), sweating, nervousness, fidgeting, among many others.
Vicarious embarrassment
editHumans are capable of experiencing many things vicariously - be it emotions such as the pain at others injuries, joy for others successes, or social pains such as seeing someone else rejected or experience a failure (Müller-Pinzler et al., 2016). Similarly, embarrassment can be experienced vicariously, where vicarious embarrassment is the feeling of embarrassment from observing another person doing something embarrassing. Because it is vicarious it is not a feeling of embarrassment for oneself but instead experienced as embarrassment for someone else. This can be experienced through the same means as embarrassment in blushing, sweating, nervousness, or through less severe symptoms such as cringing or discomfort (Krach et al., 2011).
This embarrassment can occur in a manner of ways. For example, vicarious embarrassment is not restricted to people who an individual knows on a personal level, but can also occur as a result of a stranger doing something embarrassing. It can also occur regardless of another individual's level of embarrassment. For instance, if someone is unaware that they are engaging in an embarrassing behaviour, or if they are aware but not embarrassed by said behaviour, another individual may still experience vicarious embarrassment (Krach et al., 2011).
Embarrassment, vicarious embarrassment, and shame
editThere is notably a large conceptual overlap between embarrassment and shame, and thus vicarious embarrassment and vicarious shame, and they are often grouped together when describing emotions (Mayer et al., 2021). Both appear to depend on self-consciousness and exist as a response to transgressions of social norms, however appear to differ in their severity levels with shame leading to anger and disgust and embarrassment leading to jokes (Miller & Tangney, 1994). Embarrassment is suggested to be an element of shame, with shame stemming from more serious failures than embarrassment which is a result of minor transgressions (Ziegler et al., 2022). Mayer et al. (2021) indicate that vicarious shame can arise from vicarious embarrassment when the observed individuals behaviour starts to threaten ones own self image and social identity, if it has serious moral implications, or if there is a significant relationship between the viewer and the target
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Case Study: Casey was enjoying herself watching 'I Think You Should Leave with Tim Robinson', a television series hinging on vicarious embarrassment. During the skits where someone did something embarrasing Casey would laugh along and was having a good time. However, when a skit came on that focused on someone inviting her very embarrassing and disliked boyfriend to a party Casey began to feel she was experiencing shame. What may have happened is that the behaviour being ridiculed started to encroach on Caseys own self image, leading to her feeling humiliated. Casey went from enjoying the vicarious embarrassment brought upon by the show, to feeling that it had moved into vicarious shame. |
Neuropsychology of vicarious embarrassment
editThe neural foundation of embarrassment and vicarious embarassment is going to be quite similar inherently, due to being quite similar emotions and both needing to operate of the same pathways of embarrassment. The major difference between the two is that vicarious embarrassment needs to add brain regions that assess situational threats, undersand others emotions, empathise, or understand ingroups and outgroups, in order for an individual to feel embarrassment as a result of others.
Embarrassment
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The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), proposed to be responsible for putting oneself in the mental world of others, self-reflection in the context of others, thinking about past and future events, or daydreaming, has been found to have increased activity during experiences of embarrassment (Paulus et al., 2015; Müller-Pinzler et al., 2015). Similarly the precuneus, proposed to be responsible for many of the same tasks as the mPFC, has also been found to be more active during embarrassing experiences.
The anterior insula (AI) (see Figure 4) was also active during embarrassment (Müller-Pinzler et al., 2015). It is proposed that this is due to it playing a role in the conscious awareness of positive and negative emotional states, as well as being related to recognising both self and others' perspectives (Cheng et al., 2010). Similarly, the amygdala, which plays a large role in negative emotions, has been found to be more active during embarrassing scenarios (Paulus et al., 2015).
Vicarious embarrassment
editVicarious embarrassment has been associated with increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the precuneus (Müller-Pinzler et al., 2015). In addition to the mPFC role in embarrassment, it may also be required to put oneself in the mind of not only the person who is engaging in embarrassing behaviour, but also in the mind of onlookers. Similarly, if the mPFC is responsible for thinking of past events, it may play a role in being able to relate and empathise with another.
Studies found that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), proposed to be responsible for the experience of both social and physical pain was active during the experience of vicarious embarrassment as well as being strongly connected to the AI during this activity (Paulus et al., 2015). Furthermore the AI has been linked with empathy - specifically the ability to see, recognise, and experience the emotional state of others, given its function of understanding the perspective of others (Eisenberger, 2012; Gu et al., 2012; Masten et al., 2011). From this it is proposed that the ACC and AI work together to understand and empathise with the social pain of embarrassment that another is experiencing, and then representing them as negative conscious emotions. This may also be aided by the amygdala, which was similarly active during vicarious embarrassment.
Lastly the precuneus, AI, and ACC were all more active in response to observing embarrassing behaviours of a close friend than a stranger (Müller-Pinzler et al., 2016). These support the idea that social closeness is a moderating factor in vicarious embarrassment, suggesting that when there is an overlap between ones own social integrity and the observed individuals it leads to higher levels of vicarious embarrassment.
There are some problems with the roles of the ACC, AI, and amygdala in the literature. Due to the strong overlap in function and high connectivity between these areas it is difficult to tell which area is active first, which is responsible for what function, and if an area is only active due to the activity of its neighbour. For example, in the study by Paulus et al. (2015) the ACC and AI are only ever mentioned together and the study does not attempt to differentiate between the function of the two areas. Similarly, the study discusses how the amygdala and the AI are strongly connected, but is uncertain about whether high activity in the amygdala triggers high activity in the insula, or vice versa. Overall it is sufficiently evidenced that all of these areas play some role in vicarious embarrassment, though the exact nature of that role is unclear.
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Psychology of vicarious embarrassment
editCurrently understandings of the psychological underpinning of vicarious embarrassment are a blend of many different understandings. Previously, empathy was accepted as the primary if not only aspect of vicarious embarrassment (Krach et al., 2011), but given the growing yet still underdeveloped understanding and complexity of the topic many explanations are accepted to be true at once.
Empathy and egocentrism
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Empathy is the ability for an observer to represent the same emotion that they are observing in another person with the knowledge that the reason they are experiencing said emotion is due to the observed persons emotion, typically leading to an outward support (see Figure 5; Paulus et al., 2013). This is also evidenced with regard to empathetic emotions and vicarious embarrassment - those who are higher in levels of empathy experience stronger vicarious embarrassment that those who are low in empathy (Müller-Pinzler et al., 2016). There are also findings suggesting that empathy is strengthened when it comes to social closeness, with individuals experiencing higher levels of empathy towards someone they are relationally closer to (Shearn et al., 1999). However, there are situations in which the observed individual is not experiencing any embarrassment, such as an actor playing an embarrassing situation, where the observer will still experience vicarious embarrassment.
A proposed explanation is that of egocentrism, where the vicarious embarassment stems not from sharing the experience of the observed individual but imagining what it would be like for oneself to be in that scenario (Ziegler et al., 2022). This would mean that rather than empathising, the observer is representing the other persons states based on their own experience, knowledge, and judgement, rather than the observed individuals (Mayer et al., 2021). This can explain what empathy alone misses - while an actor in a show is not experiencing embarrassment, from the audience perspective the character they are portraying may be, or perhaps the audience would be experiencing embarrassment if they were in that scenario.
There are however some blurred lines between empathy and egocentrism in terms of explaining vicarious embarrassment. Past experiences may come into play for egocentrism to serve as a platform for the observer to represent their own beliefs, however it may also serve to explain empathy to a degree - where the ability to empathise may be strengthened by having a shared experience, and thus being able to relate more to the other persons emotional state. Another example is that of egocentrism itself where in some cases the observer may be projecting themselves into the other persons position and trying to understand the other persons thoughts, without applying their own personal judgements to the situation, which may land in between egocentrism and empathy.
Social closeness
editSocial closeness is discussed at many points in vicarious embarrassment. There is a lot of evidence suggesting that if a viewer is closer friends with a participant during an embarrassing moment they will have a stronger experience of vicarious embarrassment than otherwise (Krach et al., 2011; Müller-Pinzler et al., 2016; Uysal et al., 2014), regardless of if the friend is embarrassed or not (Mayer et al., 2021). This is supported by similar findings regarding other types of social and physical pain wherein people experience stronger activation in anterior cingulate cortex and AI circuits (Cheng et al., 2010). There are a few possible explanations for this.
The first is that the closer two individuals are socially the vicarious embarrassment will be stronger as a result of a stronger perceived threat to one's own self image, given their association (Müller-Pinzler et al., 2016). For example, if someone started yelling at a waiter in a restaurant for making a mistake a friend of theirs may feel vicarious embarrassment if they disagree with this behaviour. This may lead to people demonstrating social control over individuals they are friends with who they deem to be potentially threatening to their social identity in this way, or potentially lead to individuals engaging in appeasement gestures to restore their social image.
Another theory is that it is easier for one to put themself in the shoes of someone who they are more familiar with over a stranger, which may be due to it being easier to imagine oneself in a friends shoes due to familiarity with the other person, thus closeness moderating empathetic response to vicarious embarrassment (Cheng et al., 2010). This may be due to more of an overlap with identity, perspective, belief systems, etc. leading to it being easier for the observer to understand both the perspective of the friend and also to place their own judgement and perspective in the body of their friend.
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Functions of vicarious embarrassment
editVicarious embarrassments main function appears to be that of a social tool extending from embarrassment. Embarrassment occurs as a result of a violation of socially accepted conduct, which causes individuals to blush, engage in other behaviours acknowledging the breach, or try to make up for it through compensatory behaviours, all in order to try and respond to the threat to ones social identity (Krishna et al., 2015). Because embarrassment serves as a pro-social behaviour it follows that vicarious embarrassment would also be pro-social, however the nature of this is somewhat different, and there are a number of proposals for the exact function with a varying amount of similarities.
One proposal is of social support - when seeing a member of an in group do something embarrassing, vicarious embarrassment serves as a form of social support to the person engaging in the behaviour by the observer simulating the emotions they would experience should they swap positions, thus sharing an understanding of the situation (Mayer et al., 2021). Similarly, Krach et al. (2011) echod that vicarious embarrassment serves as a shared acknowledgement of embarrassing situations, and that by engaging in these behaviours a positive interaction or bond can be formed between an observer and another person. These proposals also may explain why vicarious embarrassment is experienced even when the actor is unaware of their faux pas - the viewer is embarrased, and can intervene to inform the target of their mishap, thereby allowing the target to integrate better into the social group.
Management of vicarious embarrassment
editAs vicarious embarrassment is not an inherently maladaptive nor direct response management of it can be difficult. Many of its primary moderators are not things which can be easily changed due to the embarrassment inherently being a result of someone elses behaviour - such as social closeness. Similarly some other factors may prove difficult or even undesirable to manage, such as not wanting to lower onesTemplate:Gt empathy levels or ability to take the perspectives of others. However, there are some studies into mediating factors which may provide indirect avenues to assist with vicarious embarrassment.
Uysal et al. (2014) developed the vicarious embarrassment scale (VES) and found that vicarious embarrassment is positively associated with susceptibility to embarrassment, empathy, perspective-taking, and fear of negative evaluation, and negatively with self-esteem. Similarly, Thornton (2003) found that vicarious embarrassment was associated with fear of negative evaluation, and negatively associated with social skills. Thus, while not much research has been done into the management of vicarious embarrassment, it could prove beneficial to try and treat an underlying fear of negative evaluation or low self-esteem, potentially in a manner similar to that of social anxiety. For most effective practice this would mean focusing on cognitive behavioural therapy to identify potential cognitive distortions and other factors perpetuation the social anxiety, and challenging these beliefs (Rodebaugh et al., 2004).
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Case Study: Apsara struggles with watching live performances because of the vicarious embarrassment she experiences while watching them, as well as with other performances such as plays or even television shows and movies, even if there is nothing inherently embarrassing about them. She has always felt like an empathetic person, and similarly had trouble with cringe comedy and other such sources of vicarious embarrassment. Recently, Apsara was diagnosed with social anxiety disorder and has begun cognitive behavioural therapy for it.
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Conclusion
editVicarious embarrassment is an emotion experienced when observing others' public violations of social norms, differing from embarrassment due to not being a result of ones own embarrassing action and differing from vicarious shame by being less severe and resulting from less egregious violations of norms. Currently, vicarious embarrassment is understood to be a result of interplay between the amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, AI, responsible for processing the social pain of others and relating it to ones own experience and judgement, and the mPFC and precuneus, responsible for processing negative emotions and consciously representing them. Psychologically it is understood to stem from both empathising with anothers experience while also being able to assess a situation from ones own experiences, beliefs, and attitudes. More work needs to be done in the area in order to find effective methods of managing vicarious embarrassment, however currently it could theoretically be managed through treatment akin to social anxiety - treating the underlying fear of negative evaluation, low self-esteem, and susceptibility to embarrassment, in order to lessen the impact of vicarious embarrassment.
See also
edit- Anterior cingulate cortex and emotion (Book chapter, 2018)
- Embarrassment (Book chapter, 2022)
- Empathy (Book chapter, 2011)
- Social anxiety (Book chapter, 2018)
- Social norm (Wikipedia)
References
editCheng, Y., Chen, C., Lin, C.-p., Chou, K.-H., & Decety, J. (2010). Love hurts: An fMRI study. Neuroimage, 51, 923—929. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.02.047
Eisenberger, N. I. (2012). Broken hearts and broken bones: A neural perspective on the similarities between social and physical pain. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(1), 42—47. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411429455
Gu, X., Gao, Z., Wang, X., Liu, X., Knight, R. T., Hof, P. R., & Fan, J. (2012). Anterior insular cortex is necessary for empathetic pain perception. Brain, 135(9), 2726—2735. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/aws199
Krach, S., Cors, J. C., Loebell, N. C. d. E., Kircher, T., Sommer, J., Jansen, A., & Paulus, F. M. (2011). Your flaws are my pain: Linking empathy to vicarious embarrassment. PLoS ONE 6(4). Article e18675. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0018675
Krishna, A., Herd, K. B., & Aydınoğlu, N. Z. (2015). Wetting the bed at twenty-one: Embarrassment as a private emotion. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 25(3), 473—486. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jcps.2015.02.005
Masten, C. I., Morelli, S. A., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2011). An fMRI investigation of empathy for ‘social pain’ and subsequent prosocial behavior. Neuroimage, 55, 381—388. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.060
Mayer, A. V., Paulus, F. M., & Krach, S. (2021). A psychological perspective on vicarious embarrassment and shame in the context of cringe humor. Humanities, 10(4). Article 110. https://doi.org/10.3390/h10040110
Miller, R. S., & Tangney, J. P. (1994). Differentiating embarrassment and shame. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 13(3), 273—287. https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.1994.13.3.273
Müller-Pinzler, L., Gazzola, V., Keysers, C., Sommer, J., Jansen, A., Frässle, S., Einhäuser, W., Paulus, F., & Krach, S. (2015). Neural pathways of embarrassment and their modulation by social anxiety. Neuroimage, 119, 252—261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.06.036
Müller-Pinzler, L., Rademacher, L., Paulus, F. M., & Krach, S. (2016). When your friends make you cringe: social closeness modulates vicarious embarrassment-related neural activity. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11(3), 466—475. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv130
Paulus, F. M., Müller-Pinzler, L., Jansen, A., Gazzola, V., & Krach, S. (2015). Mentalizing and the role of the posterior superior temporal sulcus in sharing others' embarrassment. Cerebral Cortex, 25(8), 2065—2075. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhu011
Paulus, F. M., Müller-Pinzler, L., Westermann, S., & Krach, S. (2013). On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, Article 169. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00196
Rodebaugh, T. L., Holaway, R. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (2004). The treatment of social anxiety disorder. Clinical Psychology Review, 24(7), 883—908. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2004.07.007
Shearn, D., Spellman, L., Straley, B., Meirick, J., & Stryker, K. (1999). Empathetic blushing in friends and strangers. Motivation and Emotion, 23, 307—316. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021342910378
Tei, S., Kauppi, J.-P., Janowski, K. F., Fujino, J., Monti, R. P., Tohka, J., Abe, N., Murai, T., Takahashi, H., & Hari, R. (2020). Brain and behavioral alterations in subjects with social anxiety dominated by empathic embarrassment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 117(8), 4385—4391. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918081117
Thornton, K. C. (2003). When the source of embarrassment is a close other. Individual Differences Research, 1(3), 189—200.
Uysal, A., Akbas, G., Helvacı, E., & Metin, I. (2014). Validation and correlates of the vicarious embarrassment scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 60, 48—53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.015
Ziegler, A. H., Allen, A. M., Peloza, J., & Norris, J. I. (2022). The nature of vicarious embarrassment. Journal of Business Research, 153, 355—364. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.08.038
External links
edit- Mel Brooks, The Producers and the Ethics of Satire about Nazis Lindsay Ellis (YouTube)
- What is empathy? (VeryWellMind)
- What is shame? (VeryWellMind)