|A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z &
- w: Roger Schank, Yale University
- Minsky's frames paper has created quite a stir within AI but it is not entirely clear that any given researcher who would agree that the frames approach is correct would agree with any other researcher's conception of what exactly that meant. What is a frame anyway? [c 1] (p. 117)
- It has been apparent to researchers within the domain of natural language understanding for some time that the eventual limit to our solution of that problem would be our ability to characterize world knowledge. [c 2] In order to build a real understanding system it will be necessary to organize the knowledge that facilitates understanding. We view the process of understanding as the fitting in of new information into a previously organized view of the world. Thus we would extend our previous view of language analysis ... to the problem of understanding in general. That is, a language processor is bottom up until it gets enough information to enable it to make predictions and become top down. Input sentences ... set up expectations about what is likely to follow in the text. These expectations arise from the world knowledge that pertains to a given situation, and it is these expectations that we wish to explore here.
- We choose to call our version of frames, SCRIPTS. The concept of a script ... is a structure that is made up of slots and requirements on what can fill those slots. The structure is an interconnected whole, and what is in one slot affects what can be in another. The entire structure is a unit that describes a situation as a whole and makes sense to the user of that script, in this case the language understander. (p. 117)
- A script is a predetermined sequence of actions that define a situation. Scripts are responsible for, and can be recognized by, the fact that they allow for references to objects within them just as if that object had been mentioned before. That is, certain objects within a script may be referenced by 'the' because the script itself has implicitly introduced them. (p. 117)
- Riesbeck, C. (1974). Computer Analysis of Natural Language in Context. Ph.D. Thesis, Computer Science Dept. Stanford Univ. Stanford CA.
- Schank, R. (1973a). "Identification of Conceptualizations Underlying Natural Language." In: Schank and Colby, eds., Computer Models of Thought and Language. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company.
- Schank, R. (1973b) Causality and Reasoning. Institute for Semantic and Cognitive Studies, Technical Report 1.
- Schank, R. (1974). Understanding Paragraphs. Institute for Semantic and Cognitive Studies, Technical Report 6.
- Cited by
- Robert F. Simmons, Daniel Chester, Inferences in quantified semantic networks, Proceedings of the 5th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence, p.267-273, August 22-25, 1977, Cambridge, USA
- Robert P. Abelson, The reasoner and the inferencer don't talk much to each other, Proceedings of the 1975 workshop on Theoretical issues in natural language processing, p.3-7, June 10-13, 1975, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Mark L. Miller, Ira P. Goldstein, Structured planning and debugging, Proceedings of the 5th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence, p.773-779, August 22-25, 1977, Cambridge, USA
- Literature/1983/Barwise [^]
- Gentner, Dedre & Albert L. Stevens, eds. (1983). Mental Models. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 0-89859-242-9. [^]
- Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1983). Mental Models: Toward a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and Consciousness. Harvard University Press. [^]
- Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson (1980). Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press. [^]
- Ortony, Andrew, ed. (1979). Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge University Press. 2nd. ed. 1993. [^]
- Sacks, Sheldon, ed. (1978). Critical Inquiry, vol. 5, no. 1 (Special Issue: On Metaphor), University of Chicago. [^]
- Tomkins, Silvan (1978). "Script Theory: Differential Magnification of Affects." In: Richard A. Deinstbier. ed. Nebraska Symposium On Motivation 1978. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1979. pp. 201-236. [^]
- Gibson, Jame J. (1977). "The Theory of Affordances," pp. 67-82. In: Robert Shaw & John Bransford, eds. Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. [^]
- Chen, Peter Pin-Shan (1976). "The Entity-Relationship Model: Toward a Unified View of Data". ACM Transactions on Database Systems 1(1): 9–36. doi:10.1145/320434.320440 [^]
- Fillmore, Charles J. (1976). "Frame Semantics and the Nature of Language," in: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences: Conference on the Origin and Development of Language and Speech. Volume 280: 20-32. [^]
- Bobrow, Daniel G. & Allan M. Collins eds. (1975). Representation and Understanding: Studies in Cognitive Science (Language, Thought, and Culture). New York, NY: Academic Press. [^]
- Fodor, Jerry (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. [^]
- Kochen, Manfred, ed. (1975). Information for Action: from Knowledge to Wisdom. New York: Academic Press. [^]
- Minsky, Marvin (1975). "A Framework for Representing Knowledge," in: Winston, Patrick, ed. (1975). The Psychology of Computer Vision. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 211-77. [^]
- Nash-Webber, Bonnie L. & Roger C. Schank eds. (1975). Proceedings of the 1975 Workshop on Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing (TINLAP '75), Stroudsburg, PA: Association for Computational Linguistics. [^]
- Ricoeur, Paul (1975). The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning in Language. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin & John Costello, trans., London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. [^]
- Schank, Roger C. (1975). "The Structure of Episodes in Memory," in: Literature/1975/Bobrow pp. 237-272. [^]
- Schank, Roger (1975). "Using Knowledge to understand," in: Nash-Webber, Bonnie L. & Roger C. Schank eds. (1975). Proceedings of the 1975 Workshop on Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing (TINLAP '75), Stroudsburg, PA: Association for Computational Linguistics. pp. 117-121. [^]
- ↑ The frame and an unaccountable variety of its synonyms may well be regarded as the context (Ogden & Richards, 1923).
- ↑ World knowledge may remind you of World Brain (Wells, 1938).