Motivation and emotion/Book/2015/Life after death motivation
What motivates belief in life after death?
Overview
editAncient Egyptian civilisations were remarkable for many reasons, one being their elaborate burial practices. For many ancient Egyptian societies, death was not so final. After a complex preparation of the body and burial in a highly-adorned and well-provisioned tomb, those close to the deceased would write letters to them and were charged with the upkeep of the tomb, including making sure the deceased had continued sustenance in the hereafter (Baines & Lacovara, 2002).
Thousands of years later, in modern-day Australia, a ghost-hunting group is preparing to visit a haunted hot-spot. They have with them a multitude of equipment which they hope will catch some evidence of the paranormal. They can’t wait to share their findings with their wider ghost-hunting group, and the online community through their favourite websites and podcasts. There are always thousands of people interested in their results, and they’re hoping tonight they’ll deliver. One member of the group, Darren, believes in the existence of ghosts and theorises they may be spirits of once-living people that can’t or won’t move on. May, another member of the group, is not so sure about the afterlife, but can’t resist the temptation to explore the field and find some evidence either way.The above vignettes are very different, and their purpose is to demonstrate that afterlife belief and exploration take different forms. More examples of afterlife belief and the resulting customs and rituals are explored below. It is evident from these examples that the motivational forces behind these belief systems also motivate humans to act in certain ways and to carry out certain behaviours.
The purpose of this chapter is not to debate the existence or possibility of the afterlife, nor does it serve to undermine afterlife or religious belief. On the contrary, the chapter will demonstrate how natural and rational such beliefs are for humans.
Belief in the afterlife in human culture
editAfterlife beliefs have been demonstrated in a vast array of human societies, across cultures and throughout history (Pereira, Faisca & de Sa-Saraiva, 2012; Hodge, 2008). In Tang China (618-906), afterlife marriages, or ‘minghun’, were common, mostly driven by a desire to provide happiness to deceased relatives who had died too young to marry and in the context of an emerging Buddhist influence (Yao, 2002). Afterlife belief is central to the Islamic religion, and, as an example, it is estimated that over 99% of Malaysian Muslims believe in an afterlife (Kasmo, Usman, Idris, Basir, Yunos, Baya, Yacob, Musa & Zainal, 2015). In many traditional African cultures, afterlife beliefs focus on familial bonds, and people live in hope of one day being reunited with lost relatives. This is just a small sample of the many different beliefs found in human culture, from constructs like heaven and hell, netherworlds, reincarnation and resurrection, to ghosts and spirits.
What motivates people to believe in an afterlife?
editResearchers studying why humans are motivated to believe in an afterlife can be divided into two general groups: those who believe humans are predisposed to intuitively believe in a continuation of mental processes after death; and those who argue a culturally-derived system of beliefs (Misailidi & Kornilaki, 2015). The approaches are not mutually exclusive and they could actually depend on one another - this is as yet unclear. The debate is analogous to the classic chicken and the egg conundrum: does belief inform culture or does culture inform belief? Below, this chapter will focus on theories grounded in each of these approaches and empirical research stemming from them.
Body-self dualism
editFirstly, a concept argued to be a precursor to or by-product of belief in an afterlife, from either perspective, is the originally Greek (Cook, 2007) concept of body-self dualism (or mind-body dualism) (Heflick, Goldenberg, Hart & Kamp, 2015). If one subscribes to a body-self dualistic view, the mind and body are perceived as separate entities, each able to exist independently of the other. This duality is an important feature of human afterlife belief, and has been represented throughout cultures and time (Hodge, 2008).
Hodge (2008) argues that humans have demonstrated an overwhelmingly dualistic view throughout history, citing the common practice of treating bodies of the deceased with great care and ritual, and the representation of the body in mythological and religious texts.
Steinhart (2015) also notes that many traditional naturalistic theories relating to the overcoming of death are dualistic, which may involve the soul eternally detaching from the body or eventually re-attaching to another body (for example in reincarnation belief systems). Dualism was evident in ancient Egyptian beliefs, and these beliefs still endure today despite evidence linking mental processes with the physical brain (Heflick et al., 2015). While it must be said that not all cultural and religious views are dualistic, with such enduring and abundant evidence of afterlife belief in humans, could it be that humans are predisposed to separate the mind and body and believe in an afterlife?The theory of mind approach
editThe theory of mind approach stems from the prevalence of afterlife belief across culture and time, and is grounded on the human inability to imagine the state of death. Importantly, the intuitive approach concerns the predisposed cognitive inability to imagine the cessation of one’s own mental processes that may lead to afterlife belief, not that afterlife belief itself is explicitly in-born (Pereira et al., 2012).
Theoretical perspectives
editStudies concerning the theory of mind(ToM) have expanded to attempt to explain the development of afterlife belief. ToM denotes the ability to identify other humans and animals as agents of intention and capable of their own thought, also allowing people to transfer mental states to concepts such as ghosts (Bering, 2002). Also called ‘mind reading’, ToM is a type of metacognition - a mental state about other mental states (Shanton & Goldman, 2010).
Following on from the simulation approach to theory of mind, in which one is said to jump into another person’s mind and use imagination and available information to form a perspective for that other, Bering (2002) posited that some mental states should be easy to imagine absent (which Bering called EIA), while others would be difficult to imagine in absentia (DIA). The former group consists of biological and perceptive processes, while the latter includes thoughts and emotions (Pereira et al., 2012). Because people have no experience of death, it is very difficult to imagine the absence of these mental states when thinking about what happens after death.
Empirical research
editWhile still a relatively new field, a moderate amount of research has already been conducted to examine the link between theory of mind and afterlife beliefs.
From his work in the filed, Bering (2002) derived the simulation constraint hypothesis that explicit thoughts about dead agents would include more easy-to-imagine-absent (EIA) states than difficult-to-imagine-absent (DIA) states. After listening to a story in which the main character died, participants completed a questionnaire designed to assess their views on the dead character’s mental states according to five categories: psychobiological; perceptual; epistemic; emotional; and desire. Results indicated that people do indeed associate dead agents with mental features of which it is difficult to imagine the absence, than those that are easily imagined absent. Results were robust to belief type, even finding higher-than-expected DIA attributions in those claiming to have no belief in the afterlife. While it is important to note that these results were obtained using a small to moderate sample of university students, this study spurred a host of similar studies which add to the evidence base.
In a recent study, Misailidi and Kornilaki (2015) looked to apply Bering’s approach to children in an effort to draw more concussions about the innateness of afterlife belief. In this study, 5 to 10 year-olds in Greece were told a story about a man named George who was walking through the jungle when he was bitten by a snake and died. After agreeing that George was indeed dead, the children were asked a set of questions representing five categories similar to those used by Bering (2002) about George’s mental capacity. Children were given one point for each ‘discontinuity’ response, indicating belief that mental states cease after death. The 5 year-olds scored significantly lower on discontinuity than the two older groups (7 and 10 year-olds), but were able to accurately deny the continuation of biological processes after death. These results mirror those of an earlier study by Bering, Blasi and Bjorklund (2005), in which Spanish children were told a story about a mouse being eaten by a crocodile.
Misailidi and Kornilaki’s (2015) results provide empirical support for the simulation hypothesis. For instance, the emotional and epistemic categories recorded the lowest levels of discontinuity across all age groups reflective of the view that these DIA states are more likely to be attributed to dead agents due to an inability to imagine a scenario without them (Pereira et al., 2012). However, this study did have an unexpected finding. The children’s discontinuity scores for the ‘mental’ category, including features such as thinking and learning and analogous to Bering’s (2002) ‘epistemic’ category, were closely linked to the biological/perceptual scores. Their mental category represents DIA features, and therefore should have looked more like the emotional and epistemic category responses. However, Misailidi and Kornilaki argue that this could simply be a product of the questions asked, which used thinking in school-related activities, colliding with the children’s views of afterlife. In other words, perhaps this response reflects a belief that school-related mental activities would not be required in the afterlife.
The inability to imagine the absence of mental states has been explicitly identified by participants, and even suggested as leading to an almost default belief in afterlife. This was found by Pereira et al., (2012), when they conducted semi-structured interviews with Portugese adults (a Catholic region). A third of their participants noted an inability to imagine the cessation of their own mental states when asked to imagine their death.
The studies reviewed in this chapter collectively represent a robust finding that supports the theoretical foundation of the intuitive approach. Taken together, these findings contribute to our understanding of an innate human motivation to project known mental states onto dead agents due to an inability to imagine the absence of these mental states. Why humans have an inbuilt motivational drive to do this has yet to be made clear.
Terror management approach
editAn alternate theoretical perspective focusses on the human need to manage the fear of imminent death, and how it motivates a search for literal or symbolic immortality (Vail, Rothschild, Weise, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 2010). This perspective has roots in psychoanalysis, with Freud viewing religion as a mechanism with which to cope with the human need to manage lack of control (Kirsner, 2006).
Theoretical perspectives
editHumans are in the unique position to have both the self-preservation instinct and the intelligence to know that life must come to and end (Pyszczyznski, Greenberg & Solomon, 1997). In order to reduce the anxiety associated with this knowledge, Pyszczyznski and colleagues’ terror management theory (TMT) suggests that people:
- seek life meaning and literal and/or symbolic immortality through maintaining a personalised and benign cultural worldview in which literal and/or symbolic immortality is attainable by reaching certain standards;
- build self-esteem and personal value through living up to these standards.
Thus, people are motivated to believe in an afterlife and, by association, in mind-body dualism by the fear of imminent death (Heflick et al., 2015). According to TMT, these ‘defensive motives’ are largely unconscious as people do not consciously think about death all that often (Pyszczyznski et al., 1997).
Dual-process model
editThe dual-process model (DPM) is an extension to TMT. It posits that humans have two mechanisms with which to allay death anxiety, called proximal and distal defences. (Pyszczyznski, Greenberg & Solomon, 1999). By way of the theory, conscious thoughts of death are dealt with by pushing the thought away or assigning it to a much later date, called proximal defences. Unconscious thoughts are dealt with in a rather novel way, one that is not logically obvious. These distal defences motivate people to become more involved in their culture, seeking a valuable and meaningful life. Pyszczyznski, Greenberg & Solomon claim that unconscious thoughts are managed in such a way because there is only so much one can do to allay the fear of dying rationally.
The dual-process theory splits our defences against death anxiety into two types (Pyszczyznski, Greenberg & Solomon, 1999):
Proximal | Distal |
---|---|
Conscious | Unconscious |
Thoughts about death occur occasionally | Underlying fear is implicit and constant |
Anxiety is reduced by rationalising that one still has plenty of time left. | Anxiety is reduced by creating a meaningful life and aiming for immortality (literal or symbolic) offered by cultural worldview. |
TMT and DPM can be used to explain why people are so invested in their cultural worldviews and beliefs, and also why people engage in religious conflicts. According to TMT, because the motivation for constructing these defences is to guard against death anxiety, and in some ways a defence against death itself, a conflicting religion can be seen as a direct threat to one’s distal defences.
Empirical research
editTMT has been supported by a large body of evidence (Lewis, 2014), some of which are explored below.
Mortality salience
editA primary hypothesis stemming from terror management theory is the mortality salience hypothesis. This hypothesis states that reminding people of their impending death should increase the need for any anxiety-reducing structure (distal defences) that person has in place (Pyszczyznski et al., 1997; Pyszczyznski et al., 1999; Burke, Martens & Faucher, 2010). This hypothesis has been tested in a number of recent empirical studies using a variety of methods.
In a meta-analysis of over 160 journal articles (and over 270 effect sizes), Burke et al., (2010) reviewed the robustness of the mortality salience hypothesis and found an overall effect
size reaching the top quartile of effect sizes normally found in psychology. The studies reviewed in this meta-analysis occurred in a wide range of countries, including the US, Australia, Canada, Holland, Germany, Israel, Hong Kong and China. While the majority of the studies used convenience samples of university students, these results still demonstrate a robust effect of mortality salience on afterlife belief, particularly as it has been found across cultures.- Terror management theory emphasises a personalised and benign worldview in reducing anxiety and research has shown this to to be true (see left). This was demonstrated in Topalli, Brezina and Bernhardt’s (2012) interviews with 48 American street criminals (mostly Christian). These people lived extremely dangerous lives, and were resigned to the possibility that any day could be their last (i.e. mortality salient was very high). In addressing this possibility (as well as justifying their illegal activities), most of them had constructed a belief system in which afterlife penalty could be avoided because their god would be forgiving and understanding of what they had done. Some even theorised that they were doing good, in committing crimes against people who seemingly deserved it.
However, the mortality salience effect is not always straight-forward. Heflick et al., (2015) examined the effect of mortality salience on death anxiety and its interaction with mind-body dualism. They found a rather interesting result in that participants with low dualism reported a significantly lower inclination towards afterlife belief than in the mortality salience condition than they did in the control condition (those high in dualism performed as expected with higher afterlife belief in salience condition). This result supports the precursory role that dualism has in afterlife belief, but raises questions about why those low in dualism belief would report less afterlife belief in the salience condition than when death is not salient.
Religiosity and death anxiety
editVail, Arndt and Abdollahi (2012) conducted a series of studies on mortality salience on American Christians, Agnostics and Atheists, and Iranian Muslims. When death was made salient, a significant increase in religiosity and decrease in belief in other religions’ deities was observed for all groups except Atheists. This finding is interesting, because on first look it appears to be inconsistent with TMT; however, if Atheism fulfils the role of other religions in reducing death anxiety, then perhaps it does fit the hypothesis. This is a suggested area for further research.
One study found an interaction between afterlife anxiety and intrinsic religiosity, such that those low in intrinsic religiosity experienced significantly higher death anxiety compared to control, whereas those high in intrinsic religiosity experienced a reduction in anxiety (Van Tongeren, McIntosh, Raad & Pae, 2013). These results suggest that individual differences may play in role in the extent to which death anxiety is reduced by religion.
Applications of research (to name a few)
editArguably the most obvious application of this research concerns religion. Try as one might to keep the topics of afterlife belief and religion separate, they are linked. There is a multitude of research concerning the intersection of the two topics. While religion has been touched on where relevant, these are largely beyond the scope of this chapter.
A therapeutic approach
editTerror management theory has been used as the basis on which to develop a therapeutic anxiety reduction technique. Lewis (2013) suggests a psychoanalytic-humanistic technique could be used to evoke death anxiety, then reduce it by working through the issue and introducing effective coping strategies for coping.
Death anxiety in the elderly
editResearch has shown support for the role of a benign worldview in reducing death anxiety, as was predicted in TMT. A study conducted in Britain with Christians over the age of 60 found that intrinsic religiosity that emphasised a benign worldview (for example, the idea of eternal paradise) was associated with reduced death anxiety (Hui & Coleman, 2012). The authors suggest that benign religious support could assist the elderly manage death anxiety.
Conclusion
editWhile it is a relatively new field, the current understanding of the human motivation to believe in an afterlife has a well-developed theoretical basis. The theory of mind and terror management perspectives represent the largest bodies of literature on the subject currently available.
The theory of mind framework concerns the human inability to imagine the cessation of certain mental states after death. Research conducted in the field seems to support this view, given that children tend to identify the cessation of biological states at death with ease, yet struggle with more abstract states such as thought and desire. Adults, too, struggle to imagine the absence of these complex mental states after death. This points towards the possibility that humans are born with a motivation to conceptualise a continuation of life beyond death. The reason for this is as yet unknown.
The terror management perspective posits that afterlife belief is a response to death anxiety, the knowledge that one day we will die. Hundreds of research studies have been conducted concerning this theory, particularly by way of the mortality salience hypothesis. This research has resulted in robust findings that strongly suggest that afterlife belief may be the result of a motivational drive to reduce death anxiety.
External links
editReferences
editBering, J. M. (2002). Intuitive conceptions of dead agents’ minds: the natural foundation of afterlife beliefs as phenomenological boundary. Journal of Cognition and Culture,2(4), 265-308. doi: 10.1163/15685370260441008 Bering, J., Blasi, C. H., & Bjorklund, D. F. (2005). The development of 'afterlife' beliefs in religiously and secularly schooled children. The British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 23, 587-607.
Bering, J. (2006). The cognitive psychology of belief in the supernatural: Belief in a deity or an afterlife could be an evolutionarily advantageous by-product of people's ability to reason about the minds of others. American Scientist, 94(2), 142-149.
Burke, B. L., Martens, A., & Faucher, E. H. (2010). Two decades of terror Management Theory: A meta-analysis of mortality salience research. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 14(2), 155-195.
Cook, S. L. (2007). Funerary practices and afterlife expectations in Ancient Israel. Religion Compass, 1(6), 660-683. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2007.00045.x
Ghorbani, N., Watson, P. J., & Shahmohamadi, K. (2008). Afterlife Motivation Scale: correlations with maladjustment and incremental validity in Iranian Muslims. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 18, 22-35.
Heflick, N. A., Goldenberg, J. L., Hart, J. & Kamp, S. (2015). Death awareness and body-self dualism: A why and how of afterlife belief. European Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 267-275. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2075
Hodge, K. M. (2008). Descartes’ mistakes: How afterlife beliefs challenge the assumption that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 8, 387-415.
Hui, V. K., & Coleman, P. G. (2012). Afterlife beliefs and ego integrity as two mediators of the relationship between intrinsic religiosisdsty and personal death anxiety among older adult British Christians. Research on Aging, 35(2), 144-162. Doi: 10.1177/0164027512436429
Kasmo, M. A., Usman, A. H., Idris, F., Basir, A., Yunos, N., Baya, S. N., Yacob, M., Musa, N. Y., & Zainal, K. (2015). The perception of the Muslims in Malaysia on the belief of afterlife. Asian Social Science, 11(15), 49-54. doi: 10.5539/ass.v11n15p49
Kirsner, D. (2006). Freud, cilivilization, religion, and stoicism. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 23(2), 354-366. doi: 10.1037/0736-9735.23.2.354
Lewis, A. M. (2014). Terror Management Theory applied clinically: implications for existential-integrative psychotherapy. Death Studies, 38, 412-417.
Misailidi, P., & Konilaki, E. N. (2015). Development of afterlife beliefs in childhood: Relationship to parent beliefs and testimony. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 61(2), 290-318.
Pereira, V., Faisca, L., & de Sa-Saraiva, R. (2012). Immortality of the soul as an intuitive idea: Towards a psychological explanation of the origins of afterlife beliefs. Journal of Cognitive & Culture, 12, 101-127. DOI: 1163/156853712X633956
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1997). Why do we need what we need? A Terror Management Perspective on the roots of human social motivation. Psychological Inquiry, 8(1), 1-20.
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1999). A dual-process model of defines against conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts: An extension of TMT. Psychological Review, 106(4), 835-845.
Shanton, K., & Goldman, A. (2010). Simulation theory. WIRE’s Cognitive Science, 1, 527-538. doi: 10.1002/wcs.33
Topalli, V., Brezina, T., & Bernhardt, M. (2012). With God on my side: The paradoxical relationship between religious belief and criminality among hardcore street offenders. Theoretical Criminology,17(1), 49-69. doi: 10.1177/1362480612463114
Vail, K. E. III, Rothschild, K., Weise, D. R., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2010). A Terror Management analysis of the psychological functions of religion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14(1), 84-94.
Yao, P. (2002). Until death do us unite: Afterlife marriages in Tang China, 618-906. Journal of Family History, 27(3), 207-226.
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