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- Over the years, I've written a number of books in praise of the Computational Theory of Mind.... It is, in my view, by far the best theory of cognition that we've got; indeed, the only one we've got that's worth the bother of a serious discussion. There are facts about the mind that it accounts for and that we would be utterly at a loss to explain without it; and its central idea -- that intentional processes are syntactic operations defined on mental representations -- is strikingly elegant. There is, in short, every reason to suppose that the Computational Theory is part of the truth about cognition. (p. 1)
- Fodor, Jerry (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press. [^]
- Fodor, Jerry (1998). The Trouble with Psychological Darwinism." London Review of Books. Vol. 20 No. 2 (22 January 1998) pp. 11-13. [^]
- Fodor, Jerry (1998). In Critical Condition. MIT Press.
- Fodor, Jerry (1996). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. The 1996 John Locke Lectures. Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Pinker, Steven (1997). How the Mind Works. W. W. Norton. [^]
- Henry Plotkin (1997). Evolution in Mind: An Introduction to Evolutionary Psychology. Allen Lane.
- Fodor, Jerry (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
- Fodor, Jerry (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
- Fodor, Jerry (1983). The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. MIT Press.
- Fodor, Jerry (1979). Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, MIT Press.
- Fodor, Jerry (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. [^]